Notes from Cyberia
From time to time, Newz from Limbo ruminates on IT matters.
Many internet and other cyber glitches might be resolved with the use of redundant subroutines (that is, "failsafe" backup algorithms).
Assuming redundant subroutines are effectively independent, the
probability of system failure goes down drastically with number of such
sub-algorithms. If a software program statistically is known to fail at a
rate x, we might try pinpointing a few weak points in the program and
building in redundancies. Hence, if routine A fails, routine B takes
over and so on, up to n subroutines. Suppose subroutine A has 0.05
probability of failure, B has 0.03 and C 0.06. The total probability of
failure is then simply those quantities multiplied, or 0.00009, which is
far lower than any individual probability here.
This leads this non-expert observer to wonder whether cyber security
might be greatly improved by simply making EVERY (or nearly every)
security subroutine redundant. That is, if one lock is hacked, there are
three or four more on that particular door, greatly reducing the
likelihood of successful hacking.