Notes from Cyberia
From time to time, Newz from Limbo ruminates on IT matters.
Many internet and other cyber glitches might be resolved with the use of redundant subroutines (that is, "failsafe" backup algorithms).

Assuming redundant subroutines are effectively independent, the probability of system failure goes down drastically with number of such sub-algorithms. If a software program statistically is known to fail at a rate x, we might try pinpointing a few weak points in the program and building in redundancies. Hence, if routine A fails, routine B takes over and so on, up to n subroutines. Suppose subroutine A has 0.05 probability of failure, B has 0.03 and C 0.06. The total probability of failure is then simply those quantities multiplied, or 0.00009, which is far lower than any individual probability here.

This leads this non-expert observer to wonder whether cyber security might be greatly improved by simply making EVERY (or nearly every) security subroutine redundant. That is, if one lock is hacked, there are three or four more on that particular door, greatly reducing the likelihood of successful hacking.