Wikileaks disclosure

U.S. envoy sees little threat 

from China's rough tactics

An increasingly cocky and abrasive China is raising alarms in the international arena, acknowledged a senior U.S. diplomat in a leaked cable that plays down any menace posed by the Communist giant.

Robert Goldberg, deputy chief of the U.S. embassy in Beijing, reported that China's new "global assertiveness" was more bluster than threat, according to a leaked cable, that came from the Wikileaks cache, published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.

Goldberg entitled his report Stomp around and carry a small stick: China's new 'global assertiveness' raise hackles, but has more form than substance.

Goldberg, who assumed his post in 2009, acknowledged that "numerous third-country diplomats have complained to us that dealing with China has become more difficult in the past

year," adding that "the Europeans have been the most vocal in their criticism."

The Chinese truculence was meant to play to Chinese domestic opinion, Goldberg said, quoting "thoughtful observers."

The British embassy's political counsel said in February 2010  that China´s behavior at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit the previous December had been "truly shocking," Goldberg reported, noting that Chinese officials´ attitude toward delegates had been rude and arrogant to the point that both the British and French embassies had been instructed to complain formally about the treatment their leaders had received from the Chinese, specifically from Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei.

Chinese behavior was losing it friends worldwide, said Goldberg.

Goldberg's counsel that Chinese swagger was mostly bluster comes in the face of the need of many credit-strapped democracies -- from the European Union to the United States -- for infusions of Chinese cash to buy up government debt.

The Chinese have been active in gaining strong economic and political footholds in Africa and elsewhere and are increasingly seen by east Asian neighbors as a burgeoning military threat. The United States at one point warned the Chinese about their satellite-killer tests, which underscored the vulnerability of U.S. military technology, being highly integrated with satellite surveillance and communications.

In another leaked cable, President Bush's ambassador to South Korea, Kathleen Stephens, wrote that Chinese officials foresaw the North Korean communist regime as collapsing within two or three years of the death of the iron-fisted leader Kim Jong-Il.

Stephens said a Chinese official acknowledged her point that a strong South Korea-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. The official asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event North Korea collapses, she said.

Cables follow:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000383

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2030

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, TW, CHINA, EUN

SUBJECT: STOMP AROUND AND CARRY A SMALL STICK: CHINA´S NEW

"GLOBAL ASSERTIVENESS" RAISES HACKLES, BUT HAS MORE FORM

THAN SUBSTANCE

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Goldberg.

Reasons 1.4 B and D.

1. (C) Summary: The harsh (per usual) PRC reaction to the

recent U.S. announcement of arms sales to Taiwan and

President Obama´s intention to meet with the Dalai Lama has

focused Chinese domestic attention on a phenomenon already

observed (and criticized) abroad: China´s muscle-flexing,

triumphalism and assertiveness in its diplomacy. Foreign

diplomats note that China is making no friends with its newly

pugnacious attitude, but the popular assessment of China´s

stance, personified by the nationalistic, jingoistic and

Chinese Communist Party-affiliated newspaper Global Times

(Huanqiu Shibao), is "it´s about time." More thoughtful

observers in China argue that this attitude has more form

than substance and is designed to play to Chinese public

opinion. They are disturbed by this trend and say that Vice

Premier Li Keqiang´s speech in Davos January 28 should be

seen as evidence that China´s leadership is looking to soften

China´s perceived sharp elbows. One senior media contact

advised that foreign observers should not take Chinese

rhetorical strutting too seriously, as "actions speak louder

than words." End summary.

Aggressive Chinese Diplomacy: Losing Friends Worldwide

--------------------------------------------- ---------

2. (C) Numerous third-country diplomats have complained to us

that dealing with China has become more difficult in the past

year. The Europeans have been the most vocal in their

criticism. xxxx, EU Mission xxxx in Beijing, said EU leaders had not been happy that

at the November 2009 PRC-EU Summit, Premier Wen Jiabao had

stated that China "expected" the EU to lift its arms embargo

before the next summit. UK Embassy PolCouns xxxx

said February 4 that China´s behavior at the Copenhagen

Climate Change Summit in December had been "truly shocking"

and that Chinese officials´ attitude toward other delegations

had been rude and arrogant to the point where both the UK and

French Embassies had been instructed to complain formally

about the treatment their leaders had received from the

Chinese, specifically from Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei.

Wilson noted that the MFA had not been receptive to these

demarches and neither the UK nor France had received a

response.

3. (C) Indian and Japanese ambassadors voiced similar

complaints in recent meetings with the Ambassador. On

January 26, Indian Ambassador S. Jaishankar said India would

like to "coordinate more closely" with the United States in

the face of China´s "more aggressive approach to

international relations." Japanese Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto

said February 2 that Japanese corporations had been

experiencing some of the same difficulties doing business in

China as other international companies had reported. Japan

had noted a degree of "hubris" in China´s attitude, he said.

4. (C) Japanese xxxx told PolOff

February 5 that Japan was frustrated with Chinese

"inflexibility" on issues relating to the East China Sea. On

development of oil and gas fields, where Chinese companies

have already started extraction work, China had agreed to

Japanese participation. However, China was being "very

stubborn" and not following through on its agreements. Even

more worrying, xxxx reported, was the increased

aggressiveness of Chinese "coast guard" and naval units,

which had provoked "many dangerous encounters" with Japanese

civilian and Self-Defense Force ships. "We have not reported

all of these encounters," xxxx admitted.

5. (C) xxxx added that Japan had heard similar complaints

from its embassies in Southeast Asia about China´s behavior

on South China Sea issues. He said his Indonesian and

Singaporean colleagues in Beijing had referred to PRC policy

in the South China Sea as "more aggressive and arrogant."

The Japanese Embassy in Bangkok reported that in spring 2009

before the Pattaya ASEAN-plus-3 Summit (later rescheduled and

moved to a different location) the Chinese had been

"aggressive and difficult" on logistics and protocol issues,

alienating the other participants. "On the surface, and in

front of cameras, the Chinese are friendly. But underneath,

they are putting huge pressure on Southeast Asian countries

and trying to divide them," xxxx said.

BEIJING 00000383 002 OF 004

6. (C) The PRC had been increasingly assertive in its

interactions with Indonesia in recent years, but there had

not been any recent spike in diplomatic pressure, Indonesian

Embassy xxxx told

PolOffs February 8. xxxx noted past PRC objections to

proposed visits of the Dalai Lama and the transit of Taiwan

President Chen Shui-bian as well as the PRC´s strong reaction

to the June 2009 arrest of Chinese fishermen in Indonesia´s

EEZ. During the July 2009 visit of Foreign Minister Hassan

Wirajuda, PRC officials had insisted that the sailors had

been fishing in "historical fishing grounds" and had

reiterated extensive PRC claims in the South China Sea by

declaring to the Indonesians: "We have a border." Most

recently, however, xxxx said, relations had been better

in the run-up to State Councilor Dai Bingguo´s January 2010

visit to Indonesia.

7. (C) Norwegian Embassy xxxx told

PolOff February 9 that Oslo was unhappy with the trend of its

relations with China. Norway was proud of its human rights

dialogue with China, but there had been no results in 2009

and China had downgraded its representation at the December

2009 round from Vice Foreign Minister to Deputy Director

General. Though the Chinese had taken pains to call the

downgrade "not precedent-setting," Oslo had been

disappointed, and that disappointment had been compounded

when the Chinese sentenced democracy activist Liu Xiaobo to

11 years in prison December 25. Liu had studied in Oslo in

the 1990s and so had a "direct connection to Norway," xxxx

explained.

Domestic Criticism and a Change of Course

-----------------------------------------

8. (C) Not all Chinese foreign policy experts are comfortable

with the new PRC approach. xxxx, xxxx at Beijing News (Xinjing Bao), told PolOff

February 3 that "China´s more aggressive defense of its

interests abroad is new; this is a change in how China

presents itself abroad." He acknowledged that this stance

was popular with the Chinese public, but wondered aloud

whether the policy had been "thought through completely." He

worried that Chinese people would be disappointed if China´s

more aggressive stance backfired and caused China to lose

face. He compared China´s aggressive treatment of foreign

concerns, such as the decision to execute British citizen

Ahmed Sheikh in December despite public appeals for clemency

from UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, with the public praise

the Chinese government had given the Chinese navy in 2009.

"When China could not take any action against U.S. "spy

ships" (in the USNS Impeccable incident in March 2009) and

newspapers showed Chinese fishing boats arrayed against the

U.S. Navy, Chinese people had questioned where was their

navy, and they were disappointed." If China were to

experience diplomatic setbacks, xxxx argued, the people would

again feel that the government had overstated its strength

relative to other states and exposed China to humiliation.

For this reason, he said, China was changing its diplomatic

tune and re-focusing on Hu Jintao´s "harmonious world"

concept. For evidence, he pointed to Vice Premier Li

Keqiang´s January 28 Davos speech which he said demonstrated

a consensus Chinese leadership position that China should

play a more cooperative role in international institutions

and emphasized China´s support for the existing system.

9. (C) (NOTE: Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who is slated to take

over one of China´s leadership positions in 2012-13, gave a

speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos January 28 that

stressed the importance of collaborative efforts to solve

global problems, emphasized twice that "we are in the same

boat" (the same metaphor the Secretary used in her public

remarks in Beijing in February 2009), and reiterated that

China relied on a stable international situation so that it

could concentrate on its own internal development challenges.

Though there were a couple of digs at the United States,

such as a call for "a suitable degree of responsibility and

constraint on global reserve currency issuers," the criticism

was subtle compared to Chinese public statements in other

international forums, such as the EU Summit.)

10. (C) xxxx at the Institute of

American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,

was withering in her criticism of populist/nationalistic

media that exaggerated China´s strength and influence in the

world. Specifically citing the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao,

Chinese edition), she told PolOff February 3 that the media

was "deliberately misleading the public to sell more

newspapers." She said that the Global Times and similar

publications were guilty of "ultra-nationalism" and

"overstating Chinese capabilities." The "powerful China"

theme, she said, was dangerous and wrong. "These newspapers,

and the people, need to sober up a bit and realize the

reality of China´s position. China and the West are not on

the same level, and we are not in the same stage of

development." This inequality made China´s relations with

the West very complicated, she said, and simplistic

nationalism in the press made it very hard for China to show

the necessary flexibility and creativity in its foreign

affairs.

11. (C) In a February 9 discussion with PolOff, Beijing

University xxxx defended the Global Times´ more

"hawkish" editorial slant as "consistent with the demands of

the readers and normal for a market-driven newspaper." He

agreed that China´s leaders wanted to refocus on the "biding

one´s time and concealing one´s capability" (taoguang

yanghui) policy, even though it was not popular with the

Chinese public. xxxx said he had heard in a February 8 Global

Times internal editorial meeting (which he attended as a

frequent contributor to the op-ed pages) that Vice Premier Li

had not wanted to make the Davos speech because he had felt

it would be seen by Chinese audiences as insufficiently

muscular. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao,

however, had insisted that he do it because of his role as "a

leading figure on the economy." (NOTE: "Biding one´s time

and hiding one´s capabilities" (taoguang yanghui) is a phrase

attributed to former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping that

suggests China should go along with the global status quo

while developing its society and economy.)

12. (C) xxxx added that the text of Foreign Minister Yang

Jiechi´s speech at the Munich Security Conference February 5

had been "totally uninteresting" and had been designed to be

indistinguishable from the Li Keqiang speech. However, he

said, according to a People´s Daily reporter who had been

there (and who was also at the February 8 Global Times

editorial meeting), Yang had been "flustered" by Taiwan arms

sale-related questions during the Q-and-A session and

reverted to his "strong China" message, which became the

basis for Western media reports of his "blunt" remarks. "He

was not supposed to say that," xxxx asserted.

Public, Global Times, Love the New China

----------------------------------------

13. (C) xxxx of the Global Times´

English-language edition and a former reporter and editor of

People´s Daily, told PolOff February 9 that Chinese people

were increasingly seeking to express opinions to the

government on foreign affairs, and their primary outlets were

online and through the media, which "reflects popular

opinion." He acknowledged that the government and the

Communist Party influenced what got reported in the Chinese

press, but claimed the pressure was not heavy-handed.

"Instead of telling us what to say, they instead guide us by

saying ´more of this´ or ´less of that,´" xxxx said. He

drew a distinction between papers of record, such as People´s

Daily, which existed to promulgate the Party´s position on

issues, and "market-driven" media like Global Times, which

"must reflect public opinion to make money." Global Times,

he said, listened to its readers and therefore advocated an

editorial line that "demands international respect" for

China. China´s foreign policy tilted toward assertiveness in

2009, xxxx acknowledged, but he cautioned that this "new

trend" might not continue. "Biding our time and hiding our

capabilities" was not satisfying to the Chinese public (or

the People´s Liberation Army), xxxx said, but the government

felt it necessary to achieve China´s domestic goals.

14. (C) Global Times xxxx told

PDOff February 9 that the paper was willing to publish

different views and was actively seeking opportunities to

interview U.S. government officials. xxxx felt the current

strong Chinese rhetoric was in reaction to netizen anger at

U.S. arms sales, but that Global Times could present both

sides. The paper´s Chinese- and English-language editions

ran an opinion piece by the Ambassador February 11 noting the

importance of U.S.-China relations and explaining how U.S.

arms sales to Taiwan have maintained stability across the

Strait (creating a better, stronger and more confident

cross-Strait dynamic) for the past 30 years.

15. (C) Professor xxxx of the Central Party School´s

Institute for International Strategic Studies acknowledged

that the editorial line of Global Times made it very popular

among common people and leaders. "I read Global Times every

day," he told PolOff February 3. In this respect, Global

Times appears to sometimes outshine its parent organization,

the flagship newspaper of the Communist Party, People´s

Daily. When asked February 3 about a nuanced, full-page

analysis of U.S.-China relations published January 19 in

People´s Daily that called for restraint in addressing the

"inevitable" bilateral frictions in the relationship that

would come up in 2010, four of Beijing´s top experts in

U.S.-China affairs (including Professor xxxx and the

ubiquitous commentator xxxx of Renmin University)

confessed they were unaware of it.

Watch China´s Actions, Not Words

--------------------------------

16. (C) Global Times xxxx advised PolOff "not to

be concerned" about the aggressive tone in China´s

interaction with the West, including in recent commentary

about the U.S.-China relationship. The Chinese government

had a clear vision of China´s interests, xxxx said, and it

was most important to maintain a "favorable foreign policy

environment" for the government to pursue pressing economic

and social development goals at home. A good relationship

with the United States was essential, a view he had heard

recently expressed by Chinese officials. China´s statements

criticizing the United States on the Google case, Internet

freedom, Taiwan arms sales and the President´s planned

meeting with the Dalai Lama were all "necessary to satisfy

the Chinese people," but China´s actions in 2010 would be

aimed at preserving China´s relationships with the rest of

the world. Quoting a Chinese phrase used to describe Deng

Xiaoping´s strategy for mollifying ideological Communists

with socialist rhetoric while pursuing capitalist economic

reforms, xxxx said we should expect China in its 2010

foreign policy to "put on the left turn signal in order to

turn right."

HUNTSMAN

S E C R E T SEOUL 000272

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2034

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH

SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary -------

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Koreas collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the Norths economy. Beijing had "no will" to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyangs policies -- and the DPRK leadership "knows it." It was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei -- whom Chun characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" -- had retained his position as chief of the PRCs 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai and another senior PRC official from the younger generation both believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassadors point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations... ------------------------------------------

2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Koreas collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the Norths economy; there was "no substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministrys "briefing" to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiaruis visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press release," Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyangs policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.

...Chinas "Most Incompetent" Official... -----------------------------------------

4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRCs delegation. It had been the ROKs expectation that Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, who was hastily transferred from Tokyo back to Beijing, would be taking over from Wu. Chun said it appeared that the DPRK "must have lobbied extremely hard" for the now-retired Wu to stay on as Chinas 6PT chief. The VFM complained that Wu is the PRCs "most incompetent official," an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesnt speak English." Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRCs economic rise represented a "return to normalcy" with China as a great world power.

...Chinas "New Generation" of Korea-Hands... ---------------------------------------------

5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials like Cui Tiankai and Chinese Communist Party Central Committee International Department Vice Director Liu Jieyi stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun. Citing private conversations during previous sessions of the Six Party Talks, Chun claimed Cui and Liu both believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. The two officials, Chun said, were ready to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Koreas 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario... ---------------------------------------------

6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. Again citing his conversations with Cui Tiankai and Liu Jieyi, Chun said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a "benign alliance" -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that Chinas strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could "strengthen the centrifugal forces in Chinas minority areas."

...and Japan ------------

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassadors point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seouls control. Chun asserted that, even though "Japans preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

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INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY

RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY

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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000062

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2030

TAGS PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ECON, KN, KS, CH

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING'S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU

Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

-------

1. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy Robert King, FM Yu downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February; the North Korean leader needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an 'œincreasingly chaotic' situation at home. An unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials had recently defected to the ROK, according to Yu. The foreign minister thanked King for his willingness to press the PRC on the treatment of North Korean refugees. Yu said the ROK would provide 'œsignificant' food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK also planned to help fund work by NGOs to combat TB and multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population. At a lunch following the meeting, Seoul's point man on DPRK issues, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, reiterated the FM's call for U.S. help in persuading China to go easier on North Korean refugees. Wi also thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their North Korean kin. End summary.

FM Yu on: Prospects for North-South Summit...

--------------------------------------------- -

2. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. The ROK was discussing the issue with the DPRK, Yu said, noting that there were two major Blue House preconditions: the nuclear issue had to be on the agenda and the ROK would not pay the North to hold a summit. Yu speculated that it would 'œtake some time' for the North Koreans to 'œdigest' the preconditions.

...Rumors of a KJI Visit to China...

------------------------------------

3. (C) Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February. The North Korean leader had visited the PRC twice before in that timeframe, Yu related, adding that KJI needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an 'œincreasingly chaotic' situation at home. In particular, FM Yu claimed that the North's botched currency reform had caused 'œbig problems' for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-eun was 'œnot going smoothly.' Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasized that the defections have not been made public. End note.)

...Pressuring Beijing on Refugees...

------------------------------------

4. (C) Yu thanked Ambassador King for stating that he intended to work closely with the ROK on the issue of improving human rights conditions in North Korea. Yu also expressed appreciation for Ambassador King's willingness to engage the Chinese on the issue of North Korean refugees. Yu said he has repeatedly raised the matter with PRC FM Yang, only to get a boilerplate response emphasizing that North Koreans in China are economic migrants. Yu claimed that the number of North Koreans fleeing into China XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to increase; 2,952 North Koreans made it to the ROK in 2009 and more than that are expected in 2010. Yu noted that at least 80 percent of the refugees who come to the South are women, adding that they are often abused by human traffickers. XXXXXXXXXXXX Yu added that he was skeptical that the DPRK would engage in dialogue with the EU about human rights.

...and Humanitarian Assistance to the North

-------------------------------------------

5. (C) Responding to a question from Ambassador King, Yu said the North Korean grain harvest was approximately 4 million metric tons (MMT), which was better than expected but still short of the 4.5 MMT the regime needs to ensure stability. (Note: The official ROKG estimate is that the DPRK harvest was approximately 5 MMT. End note.) Given the North's chronic transportation and storage problems, there would be starvation 'œhere and there' during the spring, Yu lamented. The foreign minister said the ROK would be willing to provide 'œsignificant' food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK would not, Yu said, simply give the North a huge amount of grain. Any aid would be given in small amounts, he stressed. The foreign minister also said the ROK would help fund work by NGOs to combat multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population.

Follow-On Lunch with XXXXXXXXXXXX

--------------------------------

6. (C) At a lunch following the meeting with XXXXXXXXXX reiterated the FM's call for the United States to XXXXXXXXXXXX

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their relatives in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea has made only token efforts to support North-South family reunions and has 'œreacted badly' to Seoul's repeated calls for the release of the approximately 1,000 abductees and POWs believed to be still held by the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that Seoul appreciated Ambassador King's effort to keep the family reunion, abductee, and POW issues on the proverbial agenda. STEPHENS