Egypt's new No. 2 long eyed
as a likely Mubarak succesor
The new vice president of Egypt has long been seen as a likely successor to the country's besieged president, Hosni Mubarak.
Omar Suleiman, the chief of the intelligence service, was among those whom U.S. diplomats viewed as probable successors to Mubarak once he died or became incapacitated, according to a leaked State Department cable obtained by Wikileaks.
However, Mubarak has given no signal that he intends to step down to clear the way for his right-hand man.
In an allusion to American organized crime, the 2007 cable describes Suleiman, who is in his mid seventies, as Mubarak's "consigliere" (Italian for "counselor"), who had often been "cited as likely to be named to the long-vacant vice-presidential post." The cable goes on to describe how the system is rigged as a bar to true democracy.
Suleiman might serve in a transitional role, though his liking for public service is clear, the cable says.
Suleiman's age and status, the cable reads, "could be attractive to the ruling apparatus and the public at large as a reliable figure unlikely to harbor ambitions for another multi-decade presidency."
Even if Mubarak's son, Gamal, were named president, Suleiman would probably have to consent, the cable says. The whereabouts of Gamal, a banker, are unknown. Another Wikileaks cable records a conversation Gamal had with Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman about the global financial crisis. Gamal warned that, if the United States didn't restore order to its banking system, Egypt would eventually feel the brunt of the fiscal crisis.
Gamal Mubarak, according to the cable which was cleared by Lieberman, gave no hint that ordinary Egyptians were already suffering from severe economic problems.
The Lieberman cable can be found at http://wikileaks.ch
The succession cable, as found on Oslo's Aftenposten, follows.
For a group of Wikileaks cables on Egypt, scroll down. Of note is that the leaked U.S. cable on high-level Tunisian corruption preceded the Tunisian revolution, which, however, was fanned by al Jazeera coverage.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT
REF: A. CAIRO 671
B. CAIRO 974
C. 2006 CAIRO 2010
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE
INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY
CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING
TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY
SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS
EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY),
EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER.
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT´S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE
POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK´S SUCCESSOR
HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD
POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC
RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO
THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION
------------------------------
2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE
SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE
EGYPT´S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A
SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING
WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY
INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH
PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE
THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN
AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME
MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS,
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE
PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PEOPLE´S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE
PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO
NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH
STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE
DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY."
3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE
EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO
THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG
THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS
CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO
ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017),
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE
PEOPLE´S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET
THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU).
FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE:
-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION;
-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND,
-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN
BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE´S
ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE
SEATS
IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL).
4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST
IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN
"INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED
MEMBERS OF EGYPT´S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES,
OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL,
AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO
ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY´S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN
ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76
ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING
PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT"
CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE
NDP´S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE
RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS,
PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE.
--------------------
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------------
5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN
SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK
SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE
WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE
PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006
SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I
HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE
SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.
GAMAL MUBARAK
-------------
6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE
JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B).
THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN
INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN
FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I
AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE
WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE
PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES
FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT
GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.
7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS
POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS
QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.
GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK
OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN
PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL
TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN
SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE
PRESIDENT´S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL
LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE
ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT.
8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE
THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT´S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952
AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS
HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT´S
RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY
OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A
POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER,
AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
MUBARAK´S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT,
ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED
THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL
CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE
NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER
LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS.
OMAR SOLIMAN
-------------
9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE,
IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED
TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED
HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN,
BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE
TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY
PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS
ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING
APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE
UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD
RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN
ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO
WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME
HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED.
AMRE MOUSSA
-----------
10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL
PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER
INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING.
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES,
HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND
PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT,
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK´S DEATH, MOUSSA
COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS
AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.
MILITARY OFFICER
----------------
11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG
THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT´S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL
RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A
CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK´S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING
THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY
PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME
LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND
DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN
MUBARAK´S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO
ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR
COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS,
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF
COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.
OPPOSITION MEMBER
-----------------
12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,
SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY
SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN
LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL
LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE
THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO´MAN GOMAA,
LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND
SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT
CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK
INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA
IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A
SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY.
DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS
------------------------
13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE.
NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS
SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT´S IMPRESSIVE
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE
HEAD OF CAIRO´S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS
RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS
MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY
UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A
CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER.
14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA
COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND
MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND
ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA´S DE FACTO CHIEF
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE
GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL
ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE
TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE
UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF
THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY
PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY
GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED
POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR
LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND
WITH NO POWER BASES.
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
------------------
15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR
EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE
POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE
MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT
OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH
THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING
OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP´S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE
AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN
IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY
POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED.
------------------------
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS
------------------------
16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT´S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY
BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED
THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS
POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE
HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK´S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR
EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN
EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY.
RICCIARDONE
09.10.2007: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGY 27.jan.2011
...PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KMPI, EG SUBJECT: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGYREF: STATE...C) Our fundamental reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including...for our democracy promotion efforts in Egypt. End summary...
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.
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...for democracy and governance programs in Egypt for FY08 and $75m for FY09. These figures...programs carried out with the Government of Egypt in the areas of administration of justice...could consider adding funds from other Egypt ESF sources. END SUMMARY.2. (SBU...
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...crisis, and the possible ramifications for Egypt. He noted that the "silver lining" of...despite worldwide financial troubles, Egypt still hopes to meet its financial growth...that senior USG visitors will be coming to Egypt over the next few months, as we look towards...
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...smuggling operations. Gaza contacts note that Egypt has also cracked down on the travel of...through the Rafah crossing. In particular, Egypt reportedly no longer tolerates "Hamas...removed by Aftenposten] speculated that Egypt has been effective in countering bulk...
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...SUSPECTED OF FINANCING TERRORISM IN YEMEN, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR...REPORTS THAT THE SAG IS OR HAS BEEN FUNDING TERRORIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND ISRAEL. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL...
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...meets often with him. Most recently, Trabelsi is in talks with Egypts commercial giant Orascom about expanding Karthago into Egypt as a joint venture. 11. (C/NF) Other Leila siblings are Imed (controlling Societe Univers Carriers) and Moncef (owner...
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...SUSPECTED OF FINANCING TERRORISM IN YEMEN, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR...REPORTS THAT THE SAG IS OR HAS BEEN FUNDING TERRORIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND ISRAEL. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL...
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...meets often with him. Most recently, Trabelsi is in talks with Egypts commercial giant Orascom about expanding Karthago into Egypt as a joint venture. 11. (C/NF) Other Leila siblings are Imed (controlling Societe Univers Carriers) and Moncef (owner...
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...American and international NGOs, regardless of her letter, on the grounds that these organizations do not have offices in Egypt; we will contend that therefore they do not require agreements with the MFA. But we will also work towards a more workable...
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+++
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